Embodied Semantics 150 Years After Broca: Context-Dependent Negation in Novelistic Storytelling by Fuksas, Anatole Pierre
  
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2013.0016 
 
ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629  
Vol. 4 (2013), n. 2, pp. 181-191 
 
 
Embodied Semantics 150 Years After Broca:  
Context-Dependent Negation in Novelistic Storytelling 
Anatole Pierre Fuksas 
 




█ Abstract  The present study capitalizes on recent advances in neurophysiology concerning the involve-
ment of the sensory-motor system in language recognition and understanding during reading and listening 
so as to explain the various roles played by negation in novelistic descriptions since the medieval origins of 
the genre. Textual evidence from a famous medieval verse novel, Chrétien de Troyes’ Chevalier de la Char-
rette, demonstrates that negation does not simply complicate the processing of a given description. Indeed, 
negative descriptions can be completely understood only if fully integrated in a complex context which en-
tails the conceptual representation of the negated state of affairs. 
KEYWORDS: Embodied Semantics; Negation; Narrative Description; Ecology of the Novel; Medieval Verse 
Novel. 
 
█ Riassunto  La semantica incarnata 150 anni dopo Broca: la negazione contesto-dipendente nella narrazione ro-
manzesca – Questo studio approfitta delle ultime scoperte nel campo della neurofisiologia circa il coinvolgi-
mento del sistema senso-motorio nel riconoscimento e nella comprensione del linguaggio durante l’ascolto e nel 
corso della lettura silenziosa per spiegare il senso variabile e articolato della negazione nella narrazione roman-
zesca fin dalle origini medievali del genere. Evidenze testuali estratte da un famoso romanzo medievale in versi, 
il Chevalier de la Charrette di Chrétien de Troyes, consentono di illustrare come la negazione non si limiti a 
complicare il processo di comprensione di una data descrizione. Infatti, il senso delle descrizioni negative può 
essere compreso nella sua complessità soltanto se completamente integrato in un contesto che implica di neces-
sità la rappresentazione concettuale  dei fatti e delle circostanze  negate. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Semantica incarnata; Negazione; Descrizione narrativa; Ecologia del racconto; Romanzo 




█   Negation in the Brain (and in the Body) 
 
RECENT ADVANCES IN NEUROSCIENCE have 
shown that Broca’s area, classically considered a 
motor speech-production area, is involved in 
the understanding of action and imitation and 
may have evolved for interindividual commu-
nication, both through gesture and speech.1  
This major breakthrough has essentially 
confirmed the Motor Theory of Speech Per-
ception making possible a revision of the the-
ory based on new neurophysiological find-
ings.2 Some recent studies have argued that 
recognition and understanding of narrative 










language must be based on embodied 
knowledge which is elicited when reading or 
listening to stories.  
Essentially, evidence of effector-specific 
motor responses to speech and activation of 
mirror matching circuits during the pro-
cessing of action-related words and sentences 
while speaking, listening and reading throws 
open the door to an ecological theory of narra-
tive description based on embodied seman-
tics.3 In fact, the understanding of narratives 
seems to rely on the reenactment of described 
events, which itself depends on congruent ef-
fector-specific motor responses.4  
Indeed, action potential emerging from pre-
vious experience likely resonates in the body of 
the listener or the reader during the processing 
of corresponding narrative descriptions, which 
also explains why everybody responds different-
ly to the processing of the same text. 
Essentially, the ecology of the novel implies 
a theory of literary description based on em-
bodied semantics, maintaining that the pro-
cessing of described actions depends on soma-
totopically congruent sensory-motor respons-
es. Empirical evidence showing that novels do 
not just describe actual actions such as “I bite 
an apple”, “I grasp a knife”, “I kick the ball” or 
“now I push the button” may confirm the ef-
fectiveness of this ecological approach to liter-
ature.5 Opportunely, other experiments have 
also demonstrated modulation of motor sys-
tem activity during the comprehension of lan-
guage referring to events that are (apparently) 
unrelated to action.  
“Milder” theoretical approaches have 
maintained that integrated systems aimed at 
processing language are deeply rooted in spe-
cific sensory-motor experience, but have de-
veloped both historically and ontogenetically 
through layer upon layer of abstraction, so as 
to handle concepts which are not embodied 
save through their history.6  
Given that words referring to so called 
“abstract concepts” are typically and generally 
used without knowing anything about their 
etymology, patterns of increasing abstractions 
should not be considered as exclusively based 
on metaphors. However, a more radical stance 
maintains that semantics and conceptual 
knowledge are much more integrated and root-
ed in individual action-related knowledge.7 
Evidence confirming the latter view has 
emerged from studies which investigated lin-
guistic processing during the performance of a 
repetitive hand-specific action aimed at trans-
ferring beans from a wide mouthed container 
to a target.8 Interestingly, greater modulation 
of motor activity was found in hand muscles 
when subjects were reading sentences refer-
ring to “transfer” of both concrete objects and 
abstract information in comparison with re-
sponses to sentences not describing transfer. 
Such findings apparently support the idea that 
verbal descriptions of generalizations may re-
late to the embodied experience of specific 
(eventually prototypic) activities that fall 
within the conceptual field that these descrip-
tions refer to. 
A relevant array of evidence even supports 
the idea that the recognition and understand-
ing of described emotions actually depend on 
resonance with previously embodied similar 
experiences. Glenberg and colleagues have 
shown that full understanding of language re-
ferring to emotional states requires those 
emotional states to be simulated, or partially 
induced, using the same neural and bodily 
mechanisms that are recruited during the cor-
responding experiences.9 Essentially, language 
concerning emotions is grounded in emotion-
al states of the body, and simulating those 
states is a prerequisite for the full understand-
ing of the language that describes them.  
Interestingly, the remark that introduces 
the paper in which Havas, Glenberg and 
Rinck present further evidence supporting 
this view suggests that «reading a passage 
from a favorite novel makes it clear that lan-
guage evokes emotion».10 Again, assuming 
that «there is no question that language and 
emotion affect one another», Glenberg and 
his collaborators observe that «when we read 
a novel, the words may thrill, petrify, or titil-
late».11 According to such claims, a recent 
study discussed the case of emotion-related 
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language, according to Damasio’s Somatic 
Marker Hypothesis and later neurophysiolog-
ical evidence.12 
The present investigation deals with an-
other critical issue that represents an actual 
challenge for an ecological theory of the novel, 
that is, the understanding of negative descrip-
tions. Traditional cognitive approaches still 
debate the rational or irrational nature of such 
descriptions, maintaining that they basically 
introduce alternatives to reality.13  
According to views relying on the Embodied 
Cognition Framework, the understanding of 
narrative descriptions featuring events happen-
ing in the past, in the future, in dreams, while 
daydreaming or openly presented as desires, 
wishes or thoughts should depend on embodied 
action-related knowledge in the very same way 
as the processing of descriptions featuring events 
presented as taking place in the narrative “here 
and now” does. 
Indeed, an ecological approach to the nov-
el necessarily maintains that nothing can be 
told and narrated if it does not fall within the 
range of the human perceptual and interocep-
tive experience. Accordingly, the understand-
ing of negative sentences should recruit indi-
vidual embodied knowledge just as the pro-
cessing of the corresponding affirmative de-
scriptions of negated events does. Namely, the 
processing of negative descriptions must re-
cruit a mental representation of the negated 
state of affairs. 
On the whole, experiments investigating 
sentential negation have shown increased pro-
cessing costs for negative versus affirmative 
utterances. More specifically, they have re-
ported longer reaction times for negative ver-
sus affirmative sentences in a probe recogni-
tion task and shown that comprehension of 
negative clauses is more difficult compared to 
comprehension of affirmative sentences dur-
ing lexical decision tasks.14 Further investiga-
tion based on response-time experiments has 
also provided evidence for the fact that recog-
nition and comprehension of negative sen-
tences might rely on mental simulation of the 
negated situation, with negation not being 
immediately incorporated into the processing 
of the negated expression.  
Participants were required to read sentences 
of the type “The X is (not) above/below the Y” 
and were subsequently presented with a picture 
of the two objects mentioned in the sentence, 
either in the correct or in an incorrect spatial 
relation.15 A negation-by-truth-value interac-
tion was observed when the picture was pre-
sented without delay and a main effect of truth 
value was observed when the delay was 1500 
ms, both response-time patterns being well 
known from studies employing a sentence-
picture verification task. The two response-
time patterns were observed even though the 
response-time-eliciting task did not require the 
computation of truth values, moreover the de-
lay between presenting the sentence and the 
picture determined whether one or the other 
response-time pattern emerged. 
Accordingly, the two different response-
time patterns (interaction vs. main effect) do 
not depend on different processing strategies, 
being rather due to different stages of one and 
the same processing mechanism. That is, dif-
ferences in response times do not seem to be 
reflecting differences in the time needed to 
compare the representation of the picture to 
the representation of the sentence. Rather 
they depend on the degree to which the pro-
cessing of the picture is primed by the simula-
tion processes carried out while understand-
ing the sentence. 
Another response-time study investigated 
whether understanding negative sentences 
implies an available representation of the ac-
tual state of affairs, clearly demonstrating that 
this is the case for negative sentences with 
contradictory predicates.16 Indeed, subjects 
certainly developed an available representa-
tion of a closed door 1500 ms after reading a 
sentence such as “The door was not open”. 
Such findings have been interpreted as sup-
porting the idea that two contradictory states 
of affairs come to mind while processing a 
negative sentence, both indeed accessible in a 
representational format which is grounded in 




Moreover, participants in two experiments 
read negative sentences and subsequently re-
sponded to pictures of mentioned entities in 
the context of a recognition task.17 Since re-
sponses following negative sentences were 
faster when the depicted entity matched ra-
ther than mismatched the negated situation, a 
mental representation of the negated situation 
was likely crucial to the understanding of the 
negative sentence. Such results have been in-
terpreted as supporting the experiential-
simulation view of comprehension, according 
to which the understanding of language relies 
on the embodied experience of the described 
items or events. 
This array of evidence supports the idea 
that the negated state of affairs is actually 
simulated but not integrated with the repre-
sentation of the described event while under-
standing negative descriptions.18 According to 
this view, which hypothesizes reduced access 
to conceptual representations of negated 
items, reduced activations of the brain circuits 
involved in conceptual representations are to 
be expected.  
In fact, a TMS experiment showed reduced 
activity within the neural system responsible 
for action-representation during the under-
standing of negative action-related sentences 
compared to the processing of the corre-
sponding affirmative utterances.19 
The activity within the action-represen-
tation system was specifically reduced for neg-
ative action-related vs. affirmative action-
related sentences, compared to “abstract” sen-
tences. These results very likely indicate that 
negation modifies the activation of sensory-
motor systems responsible for the understand-
ing of the corresponding affirmative descrip-
tions. Namely, sentential negation transiently 
reduces access to cortical areas carrying men-
tal representations of the negated infor-
mation, causing a reduced access to semantic 
information to which the predicate of the ne-
gated propositions specifically refers.  
Other recent experiments have however 
supported the somewhat opposite idea that 
longer response-times in the understanding of 
counterfactual descriptions are due to the fact 
that negative sentences are syntactically more 
demanding than affirmative sentences. Ac-
cording to this view stronger activations of 
brain regions typically related to logical think-
ing and language processing are to be ex-
pected, as shown by a TMS study which pro-
vides evidence that the processing of nega-
tions during the comprehension of natural 
sentences generates more activation in left 
IPL than the processing of affirmative sen-
tences.20  
The same study also showed that a left 
perisylvian neural network synchronizes in 
order to resolve negations, especially whenev-
er requirements for meaning integration are 
enhanced.  
Such findings have been interpreted as 
consistent with the idea that the understand-
ing of negative sentences requires more pro-
cessing costs than the comprehension of af-
firmative sentences. According to this view, 
the processing of negative sentences implies 
that more demanding problem solving strate-
gies are required for extracting the correct 
content of a negative sentence.  
However, relevant evidence also supports 
the opposite idea that slow response times for 
processing negations does not just result from 
more complex logical inference, since a mental 
representation of the negated state of affairs is 
rather crucial to the understanding of negative 
descriptions. 
 
█ Embodied Processing of Novelistic Negations 
 
Hence, mental representations of negated 
state of affairs likely rely on reduced activa-
tion of the neural circuits which are responsi-
ble for the understanding of actions when 
these negative descriptions include action-
related language. Accordingly, the recognition 
and the understanding of complex negative 
utterances should imply reduced access to the 
incongruent sensory motor and perceptual re-
sponses.  
This hypothesis might explain the remark-
able effectiveness of some negative descrip-
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tions which are typical of novelistic storytell-
ing since the very origins of the genre, such as 
the following excerpt from the Chevalier de la 
charrette (vv. 3823-3835): 
 
La parole oï Lanceloz, 
Ne puis que li darriens moz 
De la boche li fu colez, 
Puis qu’ele ot dit: «Quant vos volez 
Que il se taigne, jel voel bien,» 
Puis Lanceloz por nule rien 
Nel tochast ne ne se meüst, 
Se il ocirre le deüst. 
Il nel toche ne ne se muet; 
Et cil fiert lui tant com il puet, 
D’ire et de honte forssenez, 
Quant ot qu’il est a ce menez 
Que il covient por lui proier.21 
 
Queen Guenièvre and King Bademagu of 
Gorre have just agreed to suspend the fight 
between her champion Lancelot and his son 
Meleagant, until it can be resumed one year 
later in the presence of King Arthur (vv. 3783-
3812). Previous verses have made it clear that 
the agreement between Guenavere and 
Bademagu is public, so that Lancelot and Mel-
eagant can hear what they are saying (vv. 
3813-3815).  
Moreover, Chrétien clearly stresses that 
Love requires the true lover to immediately 
obey the command of the beloved person, 
which explains why Lancelot immediately 
stops fighting after he hears the Queen and 
Bademagu agreeing to delay the combat (vv. 
3816-3822). Responses to the processing of 
such a perceptual event, which imply an un-
derstanding of what Guenavere and Bade-
magu are saying, are described in the next 4 
couplets, totaling eight verses, with four de-
voted to each character. 
The first pair of couplets (vv. 3828-3831) 
describe Lancelot’s reaction by means of three 
negative sentences. The first and the second 
are hypothetical utterances clearly stating that 
for no reason in the world, not even in a life-
threatening circumstance, would Lancelot hit 
his opponent or even move. The third pro-
vides readers and listeners with the effect of 
this statement, presenting Lancelot as neither 
hitting his opponent nor moving. 
The negated state of affairs, which should 
be somewhat present in the mental state of the 
audience, is fully described per opposita in the 
following verses, where Meleagant’s reaction 
is openly stressed (v. 3832-3835). Indeed, 
Lancelot neither fights nor moves whereas 
Meleagant keeps hitting him with furious 
blows. The emotional states which underlie 
the reaction of both characters are clearly de-
scribed, the love that Lancelot feels for the 
Queen being compared to the anger that mo-
tivates Meleagant when he realizes that his fa-
ther is interceding on his behalf. 
Essentially, both Lancelot’s and Melea-
gant’s activity patterns follow the linear 
scheme which leads from the emotional pro-
cessing of a perceptual experience to an actual 
response which entails motor implications. 
Interestingly, the description of Lancelot’s re-
action employs negation in order to hinder the 
actualization of the latent action potential, 
whereas, the very same action potential is fully 
deployed in the subsequent description of 
Meleagant’s actual response. 
This textual evidence clearly shows that 
negation does not just complicate the pro-
cessing of a given description, but rather plays 
a crucial role in discursive contexts which are 
completely understood only when fully inte-
grated in a complex conceptual representation 
entailing the negated state of affairs. These 
complex descriptions seriously challenge the 
idea that the understanding of negative sen-
tences simply entails more processing costs 
than the comprehension of affirmative sen-
tences merely because the processing of nega-
tions implies a more demanding problem solv-
ing strategy for extracting the correct content 
of the sentence.  
Indeed, the problem solving strategy re-
quired to fully understand the presented de-
scription does not just depend on negation, 
but rather involves the integration of negative 
utterances into a dialectic where opposite be-




emotional processing of the very same percep-
tual event are compared. 
More specifically, the complete under-
standing of the described circumstance de-
pends on the dialectic comparison between 
two different descriptions referring to oppo-
site behaviors which fit the very same situa-
tion. It looks extremely likely that the negative 
description of Lancelot’s reaction causes re-
duced access to sensory-motor responses 
which are then fully triggered by the following 
affirmative description of Meleagant’s re-
sponse. Further complexity clearly emerges 
from another interesting episode in the very 
same medieval novel, which calls into question 
other aspects related to the involvement of 
embodied experience in the understanding of 
negative descriptions (vv. 4570-4581): 
 
Que por la gent de son ostel 
Se fet las et se fet couchier; 
Mes n’ot mie son lit molt chier 
Que por rien il n’i reposast, 
N’il ne poïst ne il n’osast, 
Ne il ne volsist pas avoir 
Le hardemant ne le pooir. 
Molt tost et söef s'an leva, 
Ne ce mie ne li greva 
Qu’il ne luisoit lune n’estoile, 
N’an la meison n’avoit chandoile 
Ne lanpe ne lanterne ardant.22 
 
Negative descriptions present the interac-
tion between the character and the environ-
ment in terms of invalidating the described 
facts, that is implicitly affirming that the op-
posite is “true”. Lancelot acts as if he feels 
tired and eager to sleep, so as to convince the 
surrounding people of his pretended inten-
tions. In truth, he does not plan to go to bed at 
all, since he would not be able to rest, nor 
could he or would he dare to, nor would he 
like to be able to or is he eager to rest. 
The case of Lancelot simulating tiredness 
entails an empathic pattern such as “I think 
that they think that I feel tired” implying an 
additional layer of emotional perspectivism 
based on a second level theory of the mind.23 
Readers and/or listeners are required to enact 
the “as if” state of the hero, who pretends to 
be tired and ready to go to bed, so that all the 
people who notice his presence in the hostel 
where he is supposed to rest will be convinced 
of his pretended intentions. In truth, Lancelot 
is about to leave his hostel for traveling to the 
place where Queen Guenièvre is secluded. 
Hence, the hero quickly and cautiously 
stands up without complaining about the ab-
sence of the moon and the stars nor is he 
bothered by the lack of any candle, lamp or 
lantern in the house, since the darkness is fa-
vorable for his plan. Accordingly, readers 
and/or listeners are required to empathize 
with an emotional state of the character which 
is described in negative terms. Indeed, he not 
only experiences the willingness to be awake 
and the pleasure of being surrounded by 
darkness, but is rather unwilling to sleep and 
unperturbed by the lack of moonlight, star-
light or any artificial light. 
But why is describing a character as “will-
ing to be awake” not the same as describing 
him as “unable to sleep”? Why is describing a 
night or a place as simply “dark” different 
than describing them as “moonless” and “lack-
ing any starlight” or “lacking any source of 
light”? What is the narrative difference be-
tween the two descriptive styles and why do 
novelists adopt the latter in such circumstanc-
es since the very origins of the genre? 
The banal answer is because they can, that 
is because natural language allows them to do 
so, whereas a more complex account might 
call into question a narrative strategy revolv-
ing around perspectivism and amplificatio. 
Indeed, the counterfactual description of the 
bed, the expected rest, the moon, the stars, the 
candle, the lamp and the lantern stress the 
subtle mismatch between desire and expecta-
tions, which makes all the difference between 
the actual and pretended situation. A mental 
representation of the negated state of affairs 
triggers special emphasis and facilitates the 
alternate adoption of multiple visual and emo-
tional angles. 
Other implications clearly emerge from 
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another episode of the very same novel, in 
which Lancelot is unable to attend the battle 
against the nasty Meleagant, who has locked 
him up in a tower. Negation plays a relevant 
role in the description of this situation, which 
features Lancelot complaining about his dra-
matic situation and Meleagant’s sister, who 
left her castle so as to look for him (vv. 6552-
6577): 
 
Mes lors cele qui aval muse 
 Quanqu’il ot dit et entandu; 
 N’a plus longuemant atandu, 
 C’or set qu'ele est bien assenee, 
 Si l’apele come senee:   
«Lancelot!», quanqu’el puet et plus, 
 «Amis, vos qui estes lessus, 
 Parlez a une vostre amie!» 
 Mes cil dedanz ne l’oï mie. 
 Et cele plus et plus s’esforce, 
 Tant que cil qui n’a point de force 
 L’antroï, si s’an merveilla 
 Que puet estre qui l’apela.   
 La voiz entant, apeler s’ot, 
 Mes qui l’apele il ne le sot: 
 Fantosme cuide que ce soit.   
 Tot entor soi garde et porvoit 
 Savoir se il verroit nelui; 
 Mes ne voit fors la tor et lui. 
«Dex, fet il, qu’est ice que j’oi? 
 J’oi parler et neant ne voi! 
 Par foi, ce est plus que mervoille, 
 Si ne dor je pas, ençois voille. 
 Espoir, s’il m’avenist an songe, 
 Cuidasse que ce fust mançonge; 
 Mes je voil, et por ce me grieve».24 
 
Chrétien makes use of negation for de-
scribing the reaction of Meleagant’s sister af-
ter she has heard Lancelot’s complaints, which 
prompt her to action. The damsel is described 
as “not waiting a long time” before calling 
Lancelot’s name, the negative locution con-
veying the idea that she acts promptly (v. 
6554). Interestingly, an affirmative clause de-
scribes the actual action of the damsel calling the 
name of the hero, whereas the next negative sen-
tence describes the missing perceptual response 
(v. 6560). 
Indeed, Lancelot cannot hear the damsel, 
so that she has to call him more and more 
loudly before he realizes that a female voice is 
calling his name (v. 6565). Negation is used 
again for describing Lancelot as being unable 
to discern who is calling him, to the point that 
he ends up thinking that he has heard a phan-
tom (vv. 6566-6567). Indeed, he unsuccessful-
ly tries to integrate auditory and visual percep-
tion, a negative sentence describing his inabil-
ity to see anybody around him (v. 6570). 
The situation is clearly assessed in direct 
speech, so that the audience is provided with a 
perspectival description which clearly adopts 
the perceptual angle of the protagonist (vv. 
6571-6577). Lancelot clearly states that he has 
heard a voice but sees nobody and feels scared 
since he is aware of the fact he is not sleeping, 
being instead wide awake. The very same state 
of affairs is described twice in a single verse (v. 
6574) thanks to a negative clause immediately 
followed by the corresponding affirmative 
counterpart. 
Lancelot openly states that he is worried 
about his mental state because he cannot simp-
ly dismiss his awareness of the voice calling him 
as a perceptual event simulated while dream-
ing. This complex description exerts negation 
in multiple circumstances, by emphasizing the 
mismatch between the actual situation and the 
way the character deals with it. Interestingly, 
the protagonist self-assesses his mental state 
clearly dismissing  «mervoille», «songe» and 
«mensonge» as inappropriate explanations. 
 
█ Negations are not all the same 
 
Taken together, these descriptions from 
the Chevalier de la Charrette clearly show that 
negation can only be understood within a se-
mantic context which completely changes 
from one episode to another. In sum, a medie-
val verse novel which is still clearly under-
standable some 800 years after its composi-
tion shows that negations are not always the 
same. Rather, any negative description pre-




cessing strategies, even when extracted from a 
very particular context such as a highly for-
matted medieval verse novel. 
The first text provides the audience with a 
negative description of an action which is not 
being performed by the hero, followed by an 
affirmative description of the very same ac-
tion being performed by his opponent. The 
negated state of affairs is openly presented 
side by side with the activity pattern which it 
negates. Essentially, the author provides the 
audience with a mimetic description of the 
process that likely underlies the understanding 
of negative utterances. 
The second describes a complex behavior 
on the part of the hero, who pretends to be 
tired and willing to go to bed so as to deceive 
the surrounding people, whereas he plans to 
capitalize on the absence of the moon, the 
stars and any artificial light to sneak away 
and go meet Guenièvre. The author employs 
negation for describing this deceptive behav-
ior by stressing all items and events which are 
relevant to the understanding of the situation 
from different points of views. Basically, ne-
gation is part of a narrative strategy which 
emphasizes perspectivism, that is a narrative 
strategy favoring the adoption of specific 
perceptual and emotional angles on de-
scribed events. 
The third in a sense summarizes the evi-
dence emerging from the previous episodes, 
since it presents a different case of perspectiv-
ism in which the actual state of affairs is de-
scribed side by side with a missing perceptual 
event.  Essentially, the state of affairs is only 
negated from the perceptual angle specific to 
the protagonist, which the audience is re-
quired to adopt so as to make sense of the epi-
sode. Hence, the understanding of negation 
and perspective-taking are part of the very 
same processing strategy required to grasp the 
meaning of a complex situation and to fully 
appreciate its dramatic extent. 
Assuming that the sense of a description is 
completely understood only when all its parts 
are integrated, the idea that the processing of 
negations relies on specialized syntactic mod-
ules looks extremely unlikely. Indeed, the un-
derstanding of negations implies processing 
strategies which do not always resolve within 
the borders of a clause or a sentence. Indeed 
such understanding often requires a complex 
integration of wider textual segments whose 
boundaries are mainly recognized by readers 
and/or listeners thanks to non-linguistic fea-
tures, such as prosody, rhyme or para-textual 
markers, namely paragraphs.  
Literary texts provide selected audiences 
with narrative circumstances characterized by 
semantic complexity, which aims at facilitat-
ing a full understanding of multiple episodes 
at once, despite misleading appearances that 
might suggest the opposite. Deep integration 
of this semantic complexity makes evident 
that understanding negation cannot simply 
rely on logical processing of syntactic features. 
And it is very likely that basic linguistic utter-
ances also require the reader or the listener to 
develop a representation of the negated state 
of affairs while processing negative sentences. 
The idea that negation modifies the activa-
tion of sensory-motor systems responsible for 
the understanding of the corresponding af-
firmative descriptions allows for a compre-
hensive and appropriate interpretation of the 
evidence described above. Transiently re-
duced access to mental representations of ne-
gated information could explain all of the ex-
amples presented, despite the different role 
that negation plays in these varied semantic 
contexts. Indeed, in all cases negative descrip-
tions would simply require reduced access to 
conceptual representations of the negated 
items or events. 
If so, an ecological theory of the novel 
would explain why both affirmative and nega-
tive descriptions modulate sensory-motor re-
sponses in readers and/or listeners, requiring 
them to enact previous experience of de-
scribed events. The difference in the under-
standing of affirmative and negative descrip-
tions would depend on full or reduced activa-
tion of the brain circuits involved in emerging 
conceptual representations. These conclusions 
would provide additional support for the mo-
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tor theory of speech perception and embodied 
semantics, providing an effective understand-
ing of human linguistic communication, both 
spontaneous and artistically crafted. 
In particular, literary theory is moving a 
crucial step forward in understanding why the 
novel became a global standard for storytell-
ing and survived the invention of photog-
raphy, cinema, television and multimedia 
broadcasting, and was crucial to the develop-
ment of so-called web 2.0 (amazon.com most-
ly sells novels, doesn’t it?).25 The reason why 
novels continue to be attractive in the age of 
global communication is that the embodied 
processing of narrative descriptions entails di-
rect involvement of the neural networks 
which are responsible for the actual experi-
ence of described perceptual events, emotions, 
and actions.  
Essentially, what modern readers and the 
audiences of medieval novels in the XIIth and 
XIIIth century have in common is a region of 
the brain named after Paul Broca, which does 
not just recognize and regulate the production 
of linguistic descriptions, being also part of the 
neural networks that process the correspond-
ing sensory-motor responses. 
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